Feature: Too many questions
It may look like Russia is playing its hand well, but there are too many unanswered questions about where this crisis is heading for Moscow to be truly in control.
Those looking at the situation purely through the lens of the EU could easily be excused for congratulating Russia. The truth is that the EU is hopelessly divided by the current crisis. Russia has done an awful lot to irritate the west. But it has, so far, not done enough to unite the EU against its actions. That is surely finesse of the highest calibre.
The divide is clear enough. Edward McMillan-Scott MEP, vice president of the European parliament, echoes the British view that the EU should stand firm against Russian aggression. “The EU is supposed to stand up for human rights and democracy – it’s been giving up on that,” he said. He says Britain and the outer core of the EU – “tough-minded and experienced in living under communism” – back up his pro-Georgian stance. They are contrasted with the “soggy middle” – primarily Germany and France – who are reluctant to confront Russia. Mr McMillan-Scott rages against the “shameful and corrosive” relationship between Germany’s former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Russian energy giant Gazprom. He says it undermines attempts to create a common approach.
Michael Denison, lecturer in international security at the University of Leeds, shares his concerns. Mr Denison says the EU, being the big organisation it is, is hopeless at putting together a common policy on the Russia-Georgia crisis. “All it can commonly agree on is an absence of conflict.” Instead of putting together a tough stance on Russia, the divergent views of its member states prevent a unified stand being taken. That’s what happens when you have disagreement on Georgian membership of Nato and how to deal with Russia. “Essentially it’s role is just that of a conflict mediator.”
But surely, if ever there was a line to be crossed, violating another country’s territorial sovereignty might be it? Not so, it seems, for this is a muddy issue. The problem is that Georgia is like a mini-USSR of its own: minority ethnic groups on its borders, dealing with issues of autonomy and central control. You could easily argue Georgia’s oppressive actions against the South Ossetians are exactly what Russia has been doing to its satellite states for years.
Russia has taken advantage of this uncertainty, Tomasz Valasek of the Centre for European Reform believes. “There is no good guy and bad guy in this conflict,” he said. “In the past, the trend has been that if Russia has gone too far the EU has pulled together. That line is very flexible. the reality is Russia’s actions have been sufficiently clouded in ambiguity.”
So, congratulations to Russia for a masterful piece of diplomacy. It has gambled in venturing uncertainly beyond the borders of South Ossetia into Georgia proper. It has agreed to a ceasefire, and continued fighting – sort of. Now, with long-term negotiations still some way off, Russia has placed itself in a supreme bargaining position with Georgia’s humiliated president Mikhail Saakashvili.
As a result we can only conclude that the west’s “soft power” has failed, Mr McMillan-Scott says. Thanks to a harsh Russian lesson, Mr Valasek says Georgia has learned “the west is not willing to defend it”. Such are the virtues, Mr Denison says, of Russia playing “19th century power politics” in an era when the EU has moved on to an “era of institutional management of world affairs”.
However triumphant the Russians might seem now, they are in no position to relax. For the Americans are coming.
US president George Bush, after days of nailbiting from his administration (and chomping at the bit from the hawkish Dick Cheney), finally sent his military into the region yesterday. Here we have US and Russian forces heading dangerously close to each other. There are no proxies here, as in the good old days of the Cold War. The obvious response is a gulp. Is this not reason for concern?
Not necessarily. Mr Valasek says it would be wrong to describe the excuse of distributing humanitarian aid to the South Ossetians as a “pretext”. It is instead reassuring that the US has chosen to decline providing direct military aid to the Georgians. And, Mr McMillan-Scott suggests, emphasising the military presence would be to undermine the significance of the aid itself. Beating the Europeans to it is a “very important move”, he believes. “It’s extraordinary we are allowing the Americans to send in aid ahead of the Europeans. To allow the Americans into our theatre is a gross misjudgement.”
Letting the Americans in might be of more genuine concern because, put simply, it is raising the stakes. In a situation where Russian troops advance towards Poti, Mr Velasek says: “The Americans will have to respond or back down. Either way it will be a tense situation.”
The horrific prospect of Russian forces clashing with the Americans has led to what he describes, in sickening terms, as a “game of chicken”. The broader messages sent by the Americans, he argues, is that “we are still with Georgia” and “you are not going to deter us from supporting it”. “They want the symbolism of US military aircraft and ships landing at Georgian ports,” he explains.
The nightmare of a return to confrontation is not yet upon us. But, more than anything else at this early stage of the crisis, it’s the unknowns which are so intimidating. Mr Velasek provides a simple list of the questions which need answering before the future of South Ossetia – and the entire region – can finally be settled. It goes something like this:
1. Will the international community uphold the principle of territorial sovereignty – and if it doesn’t, what impacts will that have?
2. If Russia has been partly responsible for the war, how does the rest of the world respond?
3. What is the fate of the negotiating track about the future of South Ossetia?
4. Are Russian forces going to withdraw, pull back to South Ossetia, or retreat to Russia’s border with Georgia?
5. Will Russia continue to have a role in South Ossetian peacekeeping, or should the contingent be internationalised?
That’s a lot of question-marks. “It’s a question of how low down the chain of national self-determination you go,” Mr Denison explains. “It would be very difficult to envisage Georgia regaining control of South Ossetia for a very long time. It is not a viable independent state, but whether or not they want Russian control or not is debatable.”
That unanswered question is at the heart of questions about the conflict’s future – and that of the region. No one – not even the tactical geniuses in the Kremlin – knows what the answers will be. That, for now, is the west’s biggest concern.
Alex Stevenson
