Labour has published 170 questions for the government on Brexit, one for each day before Article 50 is expected to be triggered, alongside an open letter to Brexit secretary David Davis. Below is the full text of the letter and the 170 questions.
Dear David,
At the Conservative Party conference last week, the Prime Minister announced that the government would trigger the Article 50 process before the end of March 2017.
After today, that gives a maximum of 170 days before Britain must begin negotiating both the terms of our exit from the European Union, and also our future relationship with our European partners on a host of issues, ranging from trade arrangements to law enforcement cooperation.
The Labour Party has consistently argued that, before embarking on those negotiations:
-the government needs to set out a clear plan of what it is seeking to achieve, and how it intends to accomplish that plan;
-that plan needs to be the subject of proper consultation with the devolved administrations, overseas territories, the Mayor of London’s office, and the Official Opposition; and
-the public’s elected representatives in Parliament should have the opportunity to vote on whether that plan is the right one to safeguard the country’s best interests post-Brexit.
None of the above is intended to stop the Brexit process from taking place, or to disregard the instructions we have been given by the British people. On the contrary, it is simply to ensure that we get the best possible deal for Britain, and one which reflects all the views of the communities that we as Members of Parliament represent.
It is also to ensure that, contrary to all public statements we have heard to date, the government actually has a clear plan of what it is intending to achieve, and that all members of the Cabinet with responsibility in this area subscribe to that same plan.
To that end, we have set out below a large number of unanswered questions about the government’s plan: 170 questions in total, across a wide variety of areas, to match the number of days after today before you must begin to present that plan to our European partners, according to your own self-imposed deadline.
If you are able to provide satisfactory answers to all these questions, just one per day from tomorrow until 31 March next year, it might give some confidence that the government is entering the Article 50 negotiations with a clear plan.
If not, it will reinforce the sense that the government is instead blundering into this process without a clear endgame in mind, repeating exactly the same mistake that the previous Prime Minister made with his ‘renegotiation’ of Britain’s EU membership last year: working to an artificial, self-imposed timetable; with a flawed Plan A of what he wanted to achieve; and no Plan B whatsoever.
As you yourself said in July: “The negotiating strategy has to be properly designed and there is some serious consultation to be done first. This is one of the reasons for taking a little time before triggering Article 50.” And yet, tomorrow we will be just 170 days away from the PM’s deadline for triggering Article 50, and there is still no sign of this negotiation strategy, or the plan it is intended to deliver.
Nor is it good enough to refuse to disclose the government’s plan, as you have done previously, on the grounds that it must be kept secret. As the Director-General of the CBI, Carolyn Fairbairn, said last week: “The government’s desire to play its negotiating cards close to its chest must be tempered by clear indications on how we will trade with the UK’s most important partner and how firms will be able to employ the people needed to drive growth.”
Speaking this week, the Conservative chair of the Treasury Select Committee, Andrew Tyrie, said: “British interests will be best served by an early and full and detailed explanation from the government of what its negotiating position is before it embarks on those discussions. What has never been discussed in any depth is what we arrive at.”
I would also urge you to reflect on the words of the Japanese government in its open letter to the UK government, published before the recent G20 summit in China:
“Uncertainty is a major concern for an economy; it evokes a sense of anxiety, causing volatility in markets, and results in the contraction of trade, investment and credit. What Japanese businesses in Europe most wish to avoid is the situation in which that they are unable to discern clearly the way the BREXIT negotiations are going, only grasping the whole picture at the last minute.
“It is imperative for the UK and the EU to regain the confidence of the world and ensure their unwavering competitiveness by increasing the predictability of the BREXIT process, ensuring the outcome is free of unpleasant surprises and reducing the risks emanating from uncertainty. From this perspective, we strongly hope that the UK and the EU will present to the world the whole picture of the BREXIT process as early as possible.”
It was quite right that the official UK response to that letter was to say: "It's not unhelpful to…have some of our trading partners setting out some of the issues they are looking at and the types of concerns or issues that they would want to be addressed. This is all more information that helps to inform our thinking on what is the right deal for Britain".
However, to do that thinking in private while refusing to share the UK’s plan in public ignores the basic essence of Japan’s appeal, and creates further and deeper uncertainty as Japanese companies investing in Britain, and other major players in this process both at home and abroad, begin to wonder whether there is any plan at all.
We hope you will resolve that uncertainty as a matter of urgency by providing answers to all the questions set out below, and the many others that have been raised with your department, and to do so in good time before 31 March next year.
Finally, given you have consistently spoken up throughout your career in a highly principled way about the importance of Parliamentary sovereignty, we hope you will reflect again on the decision to deny the country’s elected representatives the opportunity to debate and vote on the government’s plan for Brexit before Article 50 is triggered.
Again, this would not be for the purpose of blocking the Brexit process, but simply to ensure that process will lead to the best possible outcome for Britain, and that the government’s proposed plan will deliver that outcome.
As the former Attorney General, Dominic Grieve, has said: “The idea that a government could take a decision of such massive importance without parliamentary approval seems to me to be extremely far-fetched.”
We hope you will listen to Dominic, and stay true to your principles, rather than following the edicts of an increasingly authoritarian Prime Minister, who seems intent on repeating her predecessor’s mistakes, whatever the calamitous results.
Yours sincerely,
Emily Thornberry
Shadow Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Keir Starmer
Shadow Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union
Free movement of goods and services
We are assuming that the government has considered the following options for its continued postBrexit trading relationship with the European Union:
(i) maintaining full membership of the Single Market, as at present;
(ii) negotiating UK terms for membership of the European Economic Area;
(iii) negotiating UK terms for membership of the European Free Trade Agreement;
(iv) negotiating a Customs union with the EU;
(v) negotiating a bespoke, bilateral free trade deal with the EU;
(vi) adopting a unilateral free trade policy with all trading partners; and
(vii) reverting to WTO rules for future trade arrangements, including the imposition of tariffs.
In that light, please answer the following questions:
1. Which of the above options has the government definitively ruled out, which does it still have under consideration, and which does it regard as its preferred option(s) for the negotiations?
2. Of the options it is still considering, would any oblige the UK to continue abiding by Single Market regulations, and implementing new ones, despite being unable to influence their content?
3. Of the options it is still considering, would any involve the European Commission continuing to police and enforce the UK’s compliance with Single Market regulations?
4. Of the options it is still considering, would any involve the UK continuing to make net contributions to the European Union budget?
5. Of the options it is still considering, would any involve the retention of ‘State Aid’ restrictions on the ability of the government to intervene to support particular industries or regions?
6. Of the options it is still considering, which does the government believe could come into force immediately upon Britain’s exit from the European Union (i.e. no later than the end of March 2019), and which does it accept would take longer to negotiate?
7. Of the latter options above, is it the government’s intention to negotiate transitional arrangements for continued access to the Single Market while any longer-term negotiation is concluded?
8. Does the government accept that any such transitional arrangements would require the UK to continue making a sizable contribution to the EU budget for an indefinite period post-Brexit?
9. Does the government accept that any such transitional arrangements would require the UK to be bound by current and future Single Market regulations and their enforcement by the European Commission, for an indefinite period, while being unable to influence their content?
10. If it does not intend to negotiate transitional arrangements, does the government intend that – during the delay between Britain’s departure from the European Union and the negotiation of one of the options set out above – the UK would revert to WTO rules for its interim trading regime?
11. On what timescale does the government envisage securing independent representation at meetings of the World Trade Organisation, and how will the UK be represented in these meetings if there is any gap between Britain exiting the European Union and securing a ‘seat’ at the WTO?
12. In the event that there are ‘transitional arrangements’ whereby the UK retains access to the Single Market while negotiating a longer-term trade deal, who will represent the UK at meetings of the WTO during that interim period, and how will the government ensure UK interests are protected if we are still being represented by the EU? Specifically, in relation to Options (v)-(vii), if those are still under consideration:
13. How would the government ensure that any bespoke free trade agreement with the EU would include continued free trade in: (i) services; and (ii) agricultural and fishing products, and how likely does it believe it to be that EU member states will accept that?
14. How would the government avoid the imposition of ‘rules of origin’ tests on UK exporters to prove that third-country products are not transiting through the UK to avoid paying EU tariffs?
15. What assessments have the government made of the impact of re-introducing customs checks and/or tariffs on cross-border supply chains within the manufacturing sector, and will the government publish those assessments?
16. Specifically, in relation to Option (vii), what assessments have the government made of the impact of each individual product tariff on the UK manufacturers who sell those products, and will the government publish those assessments?
Free movement of people
17. Given that the Prime Minister has said continued free movement will not be part of any postBrexit deal with the EU, and has also ruled out a points-based immigration system, what system does the government now intend to introduce to manage migration from the EU to the UK?
18. What assessment has the government made of the fiscal impact of the different options it has considered for managing migration from the EU to the UK, and will it publish that assessment?
19. Will the system for managing future migration from the EU to the UK be the same as applies to citizens from other countries around the world, or does the government intend to negotiate a bespoke arrangement through the Article 50 process?
20. What assessments have the government made of the impact on different sectors (e.g. the NHS, agriculture, food production, etc.) of imposing the government’s new system for managing migration from the EU to the UK, and will the government publish those assessments?
21. Will the government consider introducing special post-Brexit migration arrangements for those sectors that are most heavily dependent on EU migrant workers?
22. Will the government also consider applying regional variations in post-Brexit migration arrangements so that different parts of the UK can agree bespoke arrangements with the government related to the different levels of EU migrant labour that they require?
23. What assessment has the government made of the viability of applying such regional variations in the migration system, and will they publish that assessment?
24. What agreement will the government seek to negotiate in relation to the continued ability of UK citizens to live, study, work or retire elsewhere in Europe without restriction, as they can at present?
25. Does the government stand by the recent remarks of the Secretary of State for International Trade that the future status of EU citizens currently living in the UK is a “negotiating card” to be played during the Article 50 process, or does it believe such language is inappropriate?
26. In that context, when will the government give a legally-binding guarantee that citizens of other EU countries currently living, working and using public services in the UK will have their rights to continue doing so entirely unaffected by Britain’s departure from the European Union, with reciprocal guarantees for UK citizens currently living elsewhere in Europe?
27. How does the government plan to ensure that UK citizens who own properties, businesses or other assets in other European countries are protected from punitive or discriminatory treatment (e.g. special taxes) once Britain leaves the European Union?
28. If the government believes that reciprocal agreement(s) will need to be reached to protect the rights of those UK citizens, does it believe that those will need to be bilateral agreements with individual member states, or a blanket agreement with all EU members secured as part of the Brexit process; and if it is the former, on what timescale with this be pursued?
29. Following Britain’s departure from the European Union, will UK citizens wishing to visit other European countries as tourists have to obtain visas in order to do so, and if so, how much will this add to the cost of a holiday to Europe for a family of four?
30. If EU citizens are also required to obtain (and pay for) visas to visit the United Kingdom in future, what assessment has the government made of the impact of those extra costs on the UK tourism sector, and will it publish that assessment?
31. What additional staff and resources will be required for UK embassies and consulates located in other European countries to process visa applications from EU citizens wishing to visit the UK, and on what timescale will those extra staffing and resourcing requirements be met?
Structural funding
32. What calculation has the government made of the amount of European Regional Development Fund and European Social Fund payments that the UK would expect to have been allocated in the 2021-27 funding tranche, which will be announced for the rest of the European Union in 2018?
33. What calculation has the government made of how those ERDF and ESF allocations would have been distributed around the regions of the UK between 2021-27, if the standard formulae for calculating those distributions were used?
34. How does the government plan to make up the shortfall in funding for those regions resulting from the loss of the ERDF and ESF allocations they would have received, into the 2020s and beyond?
35. What assessments have the government made of the impact on those regions if it fails to make up that shortfall in funding, in terms of job creation, business activity and infrastructure projects foregone, as well as the loss of programmes to fund social inclusion, transport links, etc., and will it publish those assessments?
36. If it is the government’s intention to develop a replacement system of regional funding for the long-term, can it confirm that this system will retain the seven-year tranche structure, which allows long term projects to flourish, and ensures the impact of grants can be properly assessed before they are renewed?
37. If such a replacement system is introduced, will the government confirm how this will be administered, and – if that falls to the current Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP) network – will the government take action in response to the March 2016 NAO report on the understaffing and under-resourcing of LEPs before handing them this key responsibility?
38. Will responsibility for determining the rules governing any replacement system (including the qualifying criteria for projects) be left to the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland after these are no longer determined uniformly by Europe, or will this responsibility be centralised in the Westminster government?
Agriculture and Fisheries
39. How does the government propose to replace and reform for the long-term the current system of direct payments for farmers funded through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)?
40. Will that replacement system retain the contribution of additional support to younger farmers, will it retain qualifying criteria related to standards of environmental protection and animal welfare, and will it scrap the ‘three-crop rule’ that applies under the current CAP system?
41. How does the government propose to replace for the long-term the funding currently provided for the stimulation of the rural economy through the EU’s Rural Development Programmes?
42. How does the government propose to replace for the long-term the funding currently provided by the European Union for agricultural research programmes?
43. Will the government guarantee that regulations currently enforced under the Common Fisheries Policy will not just be enshrined in UK law through the ‘Great Repeal Bill’, but will be retained for the long-term to give long-term certainty to the fishing sector over future policy?
44. How does the government plan to ensure that current reciprocal access arrangements for fishing within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of other Member States are maintained once the UK leaves the European Union?
45. Will the government also seek to negotiate accompanying reciprocal access agreements with Norway and other third countries, and ensure that these are ready to take effect immediately that the UK leaves the European Union?
46. How does the government intend to make up the shortfall in funding for the fishing sector currently derived from the European and Maritime Fisheries Fund, once Britain has left the EU?
47. Will responsibility for determining the rules governing the payment of (and qualifying criteria for) agricultural subsidies be left to the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland after these are no longer determined uniformly by Europe, or will this responsibility be centralised in the Westminster government?
Northern Ireland
The government has already confirmed that the Common Travel Area between the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland, which predates both countries’ membership of the EU, will be maintained postBrexit, but taking that as read, please answer the following questions:
48. Will the government guarantee that there will be no re-introduction of customs checks on the Irish border, similar to those that existed before the Maastricht Treaty in 1993?
49. How will the government enforce its proposed new system for managing migration from the EU if EU migrants can travel to the Irish Republic as they do at present, and then travel on into the United Kingdom via the Irish land border?
50. Will the government confirm whether – and how – the position on these matters would change if the Irish Republic was to become a member of the Schengen agreement, making travel between the rest of the European Union and Ireland much easier?
On other issues specific to Northern Ireland:
51. What specific assessment has the government made of the impact on the Northern Irish economy of its proposed future arrangements for trade with, and migration, from the European Union post-Brexit, and for its continued ability to attract foreign direct investment?
52. Will the government guarantee that any shortfalls in funding for Northern Ireland beyond 2020 arising from the loss of (i) Structural Funds; (ii) Common Agricultural Policy payments and programmes; and (iii) the PEACE programme will be made up in full from central government revenues, given the region’s heavy dependence on that funding for future peace, development and prosperity?
Employment Rights
53. Will the government guarantee that all existing employment rights underpinned by EU legislation will not just be fully transposed into UK law through the ‘Great Repeal Bill’, where they are not already, but will also be retained for the long-term, with none of the ‘watering down’ at the expense of workers for which some business groups and Leave campaigners have previously lobbied (e.g. in relation to TUPE rights, the Working Time Directive, health and safety regulations, and the rights of part-time and agency workers)?
54. Will the government guarantee that no existing employment rights will be put ‘on the table’ when it comes to: (i) negotiating trade deals with third countries in the future; or (ii) seeking to incentivise multinational companies to invest or become/remain headquartered in the UK?
55. Will the government commit to enshrine in law those protections for workers that currently derive not from EU legislation, but from judgements of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), for example their recent decision that the calculation of workers’ entitlement to holiday pay should include earnings from bonuses, commission and overtime payments?
56. Will the government give specific guarantees that employment rights for women that derive from EU legislation and ECJ rulings in relation to equal pay, pregnancy, maternity and protection against discrimination will be retained in full for the long-term after Britain’s exit from the EU?
57. Will the government rule out any plans to revive the proposal contained in Adrian Beecroft’s 2011 ‘Report on Employment Law’ to place a cap on the level of compensation that can be claimed in cases of workplace discrimination, which would currently be disallowed under EU law?
58. Will the government undertake to match any future, post-Brexit proposals agreed by the European Union to extend employment rights, to ensure that individuals working in Britain can enjoy all the same protections as workers employed in other European countries?
The Environment and Climate Change
59. Will the government guarantee to maintain current environmental standards in relation to clean bathing water, the protection of rare birds, the protection of habitats threatened by major infrastructure projects, and the cleanliness of rivers and lakes?
60. Will the government guarantee that the status of the UK’s 652 Special Areas of Conservation and Special Protection Areas will remain legally-protected after Britain’s exit from the EU?
61. Will the government guarantee to make up any post-2020 shortfall in funding for flood defences and flood relief arising from Britain’s departure from the European Union, and loss of access to relevant EU funding programmes?
62. Will the government seek to remain a part of the EU Emissions Trading System, and if not, how will it replicate the impact that membership of the EU ETS has on the UK’s ability to comply with its legally binding carbon budgets?
63. Will the government ensure that the Paris Agreement on climate change, including the goal of net zero emissions, is ratified as quickly as possible to ensure that the EU is able to ratify the deal as a bloc prior to Britain’s exit from the European Union?
64. Will the government remain committed to meeting the requirements and achieving the targets set out in the 2030 EU Climate and Energy Framework, even after Britain leaves the EU?
65. Will the government seek to remain part of the European Union negotiating bloc for future negotiations on climate change, and if not, what bloc will it seek to join?
66. Will the government guarantee to implement the plans it has submitted to the European Commission to meet the EU-agreed limits on pollution levels in major conurbations, including London, Manchester and Leeds, regardless of Brexit?
67. What assessment has the government made on the impact of any departure from the Single Market on access to imports of natural gas and electricity, and by extension on: (i) the security of the UK’s energy supplies; and (ii) the UK’s carbon emission targets?
68. Is the government still committed to meet its renewable energy targets under the EU 2020 agreement, and if not, what alternative targets – if any – is it seeking to meet?
69. Will the UK remain part of the EU Energy Union after leaving the EU?
70. In the absence of the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, what entities will be responsible for ensuring that the government complies with its own environmental regulations, and for taking legal action against the government when it fails to do so?
71. How does the government intend to make up the shortfall in current and future energy infrastructure investments, once EU investment in these projects (currently worth more than €2bn) is lost?
Law enforcement and security
72. Will the UK remain a full member of Europol after Britain leaves the European Union, and if not, what assessment has the government made of the impact of losing current Europol cooperation arrangements on law enforcement within the UK?
73. Will the UK’s law enforcement authorities still be able to directly access: (i) the Europol Information System; (ii) the Secure Information Exchange Network Application; (iii) the Passenger Name Records system; (iv) the Prüm database; (v) the European Criminal Records Information Service; and (vi) the Schengen Information System, and with no break in their ability to do so if access to these databases is still being negotiated at the time the UK leaves the European Union?
74. Will the UK remain a full participant in the Eurojust system, with no diminution or delay in our continued access to the judicial cooperation arrangements it provides?
75. What extradition arrangements will the UK reach with the EU to replace the current European Arrest Warrant agreements?
76. How long does the government expect it will take for the above arrangements to be negotiated, judging by comparable agreements that have been negotiated with other third countries?
77. What will happen in the event of any delay between Britain’s exit from the European Union and the above arrangements coming into force?
78. How long does the government expect it will take to negotiate a Mutual Legal Assistance agreement with the EU, and what will happen in the event of any delay between Britain’s exit from the European Union and that agreement coming into force?
79. How does the government plan to replace the current ‘Securing Victims Rights’ scheme for victims of intentional violent crimes to secure compensation for crimes committed in other member states?
80. How does the government plan to maintain the civil justice cooperation measures currently deriving from the Lugano Convention once Britain has left the European Union?
81. Assuming that the ECJ follows the Advocate General’s preliminary finding in the case brought by the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union and the Deputy Leader of the Labour Party on the legality of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, will the government abide by that ruling, and revise the Act accordingly, notwithstanding the Brexit vote?
82. When doesthe UK government intend to enshrine the provisions of the Network and Information Security directive into UK law, and can it confirm that this will take place before Britain leaves the European Union so that there is no difference in the regulation governing UK-based digital service providers when offering services within the UK or in the rest of Europe?
83. Will the government guarantee that future UK data protection standards will be equivalent to the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation framework starting in 2018?
Foreign and Defence Policy
84. How does the government intend to maintain the UK’s influence in the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) after Britain leaves the European Union?
85. If the UK will have no influence on CFSP post-Brexit, what assessment has the government made of the impact this will have on the UK’s broader influence throughout the world and the government’s ability to pursue its foreign policy objectives?
86. How does the government intend to maintain the UK’s participation in joint operations and initiatives taking place under the umbrella of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) after Britain leaves the European Union?
87. Does the government believe it will still be possible for the UK to retain a leadership role on joint CFSP operations (such as Operation Atalanta against piracy off the Horn of Africa), even after leaving the European Union?
88. Will the UK be obliged to leave the European Defence Agency after leaving the European Union, and if so, what plans does the government have to negotiate an agreement with the EDA enabling the UK to continue participating in its research and technology projects?
89. What assessment has the government made of the risks that, without the UK’s restraining influence, measures that we have long opposed at EU level – such as the establishment of an EU army – are more likely to come to fruition, and how does the government intend to deal with such risks in future?
90. Does the government intend to negotiate continued involvement for the UK in the work and future missions of the European Space Agency, even after Britain leaves the European Union, potentially through securing Associate Member status, similar to Canada’s?
Financial Services and Accounting
91. How does the government plan to ensure that the UK-based banking sector retains passporting 92. If full compliance with EU financial regulation is the price required to retain passporting rights, does the government accept that price, and if so, how does it propose to influence the direction and detail of future regulation at EU level?
93. Specifically, does the government intend to bring domestic legislation on ring-fencing into line with the requirements of the planned Banking Structural Reform regulation, even if the BSR regulation does not come into force until after Brexit?
94. What assessment has the government made of the potential impact on the UK foreign exchange trading sector if the European Central Bank were to succeed in a fresh attempt to bar clearing houses outside the Eurozone from trading the Euro, and does it believe the risk of such a move will be higher once Britain has left the European Union?
95. Will audit thresholds for companies be maintained at their current levels, tightened or relaxed, once Britain leaves the European Union?
96. In particular, is the government considering moving to an American model where audits would only be required for companies whose shares are publicly traded, with private companies only required to face an audit if mandated by their shareholders or debtors?
97. Will the new European Audit Regulation and Directive remain in force, as incorporated into the 2016 Ethical Standard issued by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), or will the old Ethical Standard be left in place, with oversight by the professional bodies, rather than by the FRC?
98. Does the government intend to negotiate for the UK to remain a participant in the EC Regulation regime (Council Regulation 1346/2000) governing cross-border insolvency?
99. If so, how does the government propose to ensure that the interests of UK-based creditors are not disadvantaged in future negotiations over changes to the regulatory regime for insolvencies in which the UK will have no say, e.g. if France and Italy resume their attempts to bring UK schemes of arrangement within the regime?
100. If not, how does the government propose to retain the benefits for creditors located in the UK of being able simply to recover assets from debtors located in other member states, as they are able to do at present under the terms of the EC Regulation?
Business interests
101. Among the factors that have led dozens of multinational companies to locate their European or global headquarters in the UK in recent decades, what assessment has the government made of the importance of the UK being inside the Single Market?
102. If the UK opts to leave the Single Market, what is the government's plan to persuade those multinational companies to retain their bases in the UK?
103. If the government opts to remain outside of the EEA, and negotiate its own global trade deals, how does it plan to protect the competitiveness of the UK mining and manufacturing sector against punitive tariff regimes imposed by third countries?
104. What is the current status of the bidding process to take over the Tata Steelworks, and what impact is the uncertainty over Britain's post-Brexit future having on that process?
105. Will the government be seeking to negotiate continued membership of the European Chemicals Agency, and if so, how would it ensure that the UK retained influence over its decision-making processes?
106.How will the government go about protecting the brand status of the 77 UK products currently covered by the EU's registration of products under the protected Designation of Origin, Protected Geographical Indication, and Traditional Specialty Guaranteed schemes?
107. Will the government seek to negotiate a competition cooperation agreement with the European Commission to ensure continued collaboration in tackling cartel behaviour and other anticompetitive practices, and if there is any gap between Britain leaving the European Union and this agreement coming into force, what interim arrangements will the government put in place?
108. If UK businesses are still required to abide by EU laws on consumer protection, competition law, etc. in order to keep trading to the EU, how does the government propose to influence the negotiation of these laws to protect the interests of UK businesses, once we have left the EU?
109. Does the government intend – and will it be permitted – to retain the UK’s current shareholding in the European Investment Bank (EIB) after Britain leaves the European Union; how does it believe the UK’s level of borrowing from the EIB will be affected by Brexit, if at all; and what assessment has it made on the impact of any reduction in borrowing from the EIB on levels of infrastructure spending in the UK?
110. Does the government intend to proceed with ratification of the EU agreement to establish a Unified Patent Court, in the agreement’s present form; and if not, what steps is the government taking to negotiate an alternative agreement to which it would be willing to sign up?
11. If the Unified Patent Court (UPC) goes ahead, will the Human Necessities seat of its Central Division continue to be located in London, as prescribed in Article 7(2) of the UPC agreement? Consumer Interests
112. Will the government guarantee that all existing consumer rights protections underpinned by EU legislation will not just be fully transposed into UK law through the ‘Great Repeal Bill’, where they are not already, but will also be retained for the long-term?
113. Will the government also commit to enshrine in law those protections for consumers that currently derive not from EU legislation, but from judgements of the European Court of Justice?
114. How does the government propose to ensure that the protections that UK citizens currently enjoy (on price, faulty products or mis-selling) when purchasing goods and services from businesses located in other member states – including over the Internet – are maintained once Britain leaves the European Union (e.g. the Timeshare Directive)?
115. How does the government propose to ensure that, after Brexit, UK air passengers retain the protections they currently enjoy in respect of ticket pricing, and the right to compensation, alternative transportation, overnight accommodation, etc. in the event of flight delays or cancellations, and will it guarantee reciprocal protection for EU citizens using UK carriers?
116. With data roaming charges within the European Union due to be abolished from 15 June 2017, how does the government propose to ensure that those charges are not re-introduced once Britain leaves the European Union, and will it guarantee reciprocal arrangements for EU citizens using their mobile phone in Britain in order to achieve that?
117. Will the UK continue to benefit from the EU-funded pledges to equip all ‘public places’ throughout the EU with free wireless internet access by 2020, and uninterrupted 5G access on all road and rail networks by 2025, and if not, will the government commit to match and fund the delivery of these objectives itself?
Human Rights
118. Does it remain the government’s intention to scrap the UK’s current Human Rights Act and replace it with a British Bill of Rights?
119. Will this British Bill of Rights give the same human rights protections as are currently guaranteed under the Human Rights Act, and if not, in which areas will it withdraw those protections?
120. Alternatively, is the government prepared to extend the British Bill of Rights to include protections that are covered by the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights (and to which British citizens are therefore currently entitled), but which are not currently covered by the Human Rights Act, for example rights relating to work, such as the right to strike and the right to redress following an unfair dismissal?
Education
121. As part of its Article 50 negotiating strategy, does the government intend to press for continued UK access to the Erasmus programme, including maintaining its funding contribution to the programme, so that e.g. language students in UK schools can continue to benefit from the presence of language assistants on Erasmus exchanges?
122. Similarly, will the government press for continued access to the Erasmus+ programme, so that UK teachers and students at secondary school and higher education level can continue to benefit from programmes facilitating the promotion of mobility, the learning of languages and intercultural understanding across Europe, including Comenius exchanges?
123. And will the government press for continued access to the Horizon 2020 programme, so that UK universities can stay at the top of the list across Europe for the allocation of research and innovation grants, and continue to work in collaboration with their counterparts in other European universities?
124. If the government intends to press for continued participation in these programmes, but also intends to end freedom of movement between the EU and the UK, how does it propose to avoid the fate of Switzerland, who had their access to Erasmus revoked in 2014 after imposing immigration controls?
125. Alternatively, if the government does not intend to press for continued participation in these programmes, or is unsuccessful in doing so, how does it intend to make up for the considerable shortfall in funding that will result for the education and research sectors beyond 2020?
126. What assessment has the government made of the impact of the uncertainty over future EU funding streams, particularly in the research sector, on the long-term planning of UK universities, and on their current access to collaborative research partnerships with other EU universities?
127. What will be the future migration status of EU citizens applying to study at British universities, and will this differ from the status of individuals from elsewhere in the world applying to come to the UK as students?
128. Will EU citizens applying to study at British universities from the start of the 2017/18 or 2018/19 academic years have the terms of their student status (e.g. their rates of tuition fees and their access to student loans) guaranteed for the duration of their course from the point at which they are accepted, or will they risk these terms being changed in the middle of their course?
129. What assessment has the government made of the impact of the uncertainty over the future status of EU students on levels of applications to UK universities for the 2017/18 academic year and beyond?
130. What will be the future migration status of academic professionals from other EU member states who wish to apply for academic posts at UK universities, and of academic professionals from the UK who wish to do likewise elsewhere in Europe, including in terms of the mutual recognition and quality assurance of qualifications?
Health
131. Will the government seek to negotiate post-Brexit reciprocal healthcare arrangements with other EU countries, where British citizens can continue to obtain free healthcare when travelling on the continent, and citizens from other member states can do likewise in the UK via the NHS?
132. If the government does seek to negotiate such an arrangement, but there is a delay between leaving the European Union and securing a long-term deal, what interim arrangements will apply, both for British citizens visiting other European countries and EU citizens visiting the UK?
133. In either event, if there is a short-term or permanent loss of reciprocal healthcare arrangements after Britain leaves the European Union, how will the government address the inevitable increase in health and travel insurance costs for UK holidaymakers travelling to Europe?
134. Similarly, in either event, can the government confirm that any future loss of reciprocal healthcare arrangements will have no effect on UK citizens who will be living elsewhere in Europe at the point Britain leaves the EU, or EU citizens living and working in Britain, and that their respective rights to free healthcare will be totally unaffected?
135. Will the government guarantee that the Working Time Directive will continue to operate in its current form for all NHS employees, even after Britain has left the European Union?
136. What assessment has the government made of the impact on the staffing of the medical and social care professions once its proposed new system of migration controls is imposed on medical professionals from other EU countries seeking work in Britain, and will it publish that assessment?
137. Given the potential significance of that impact, will the government consider establishing special arrangements for the NHS within its new system of controls on EU migration?
138. Will the government guarantee that the UK will continue to be involved in all current and future EU-led collaborations on Pan-European public health initiatives, including infectious disease control and cooperation against bio-terrorism?
139. Will the government guarantee that the UK will continue to participate in the centralisedmarketing authorisation procedure for the licensing, sale and regulation of medicines governedby the European Medicines Agency?140. Can the government confirm whether the aforementioned European Medicines Agency willcontinue to remain headquartered in London?
141. Will the government seek to negotiate continued access for UK research institutions to the Innovative Medicines Initiative and other EU-funded research and collaboration programmes, both to safeguard the funding streams they provide and to continue bringing together institutions from different EU countries together to pool their expertise and research?
142. To that end, will the government also guarantee that the UK will continue to adhere to the EU regulatory framework on the authorisation and conduct of clinical trials?
143. If the government does not secure this access, how does it intend to make up for the considerable shortfall in funding that will result for the medical research sectors beyond 2020, and for losing the current benefits of cross-border collaboration?
Disability
144. Will the government guarantee the full and prompt enactment of the European Accessibility Act into UK law, so that its provisions in respect of access to computers, phones, ATM and ticketing machines, e-books and television equipment are fully in force before Britain leaves the EU?
145. Will the government guarantee that all existing anti-discrimination rights for disabled people underpinned by EU legislation will not just be fully transposed into UK law through the ‘Great Repeal Bill’, where they are not already, but will also be retained for the long-term?
146. Will the government also commit to enshrine in law those protections for disabled people against discrimination that currently derive not from EU legislation, but from judgements of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, including the latter’s rulings on the government’s bedroom tax?
147. Will the government guarantee to make up any post-2020 shortfall in funding aimed at promoting accessibility, inclusion and employment opportunities for disabled people that will arise when Britain leaves the European Union?
148. Will the government also guarantee that accessibility for disabled people remains a clear and stringent part of the qualifying criteria for the grants deriving from any new funding system that replaces the ERDF and ESDF programmes after Britain leaves the European Union
Culture
149. Will the government commit to push for the UK to retain its membership of the Creative Europe programme, even after Britain leaves the European Union, so that our cultural institutions can continue to benefit from the funding and cross-border collaboration it offers?
150. As part of the above, will the government encourage those British cities who were intending to compete for the title of European Capital of Culture in 2023 (including Dundee, Leeds and Milton Keynes) to press ahead with the preparation of their bids in the knowledge that the UK will still take part in the scheme?
151. If the UK is no longer part of Creative Europe post-Brexit, how does the government intend to make up the shortfall in funding post-2020 for cultural institutions and initiatives in the UK?
152. Will the government seek access to the Digital Single Market (DSM) as part of any agreement on Britain’s future outside the European Union?
153. If it does not do so, or is unsuccessful, how does the government plan: (i) to manage the risk that films and television programmes which would otherwise have been made in Britain may be relocated to other member states to stay within the provisions of the DSM; and (ii) to deliver the benefit for UK digital subscribers of being able to access the same online content and services wherever they travel in Europe?
154. Following Britain’s departure from the EU, will football players with European passports be subject to the same work permit rules as currently apply to all other overseas players; will FIFA’s Article 19 ban on the international transfer of football players under the age of 18 be extended to transfers of European players by UK clubs; and if so, what assessment has the government made of the impact of these restrictions on the future competitiveness of UK football teams?
Transport
155. How does the government propose to protect the continued ability of the UK rail, aviation and maritime industries to operate freely within the rest of the EU?
156. In the area of aviation, if this requires the negotiation of free access to the European Common Aviation Area, how will the government ensure there is no delay between Britain leaving the European Union and such agreements being reached?
157. Given that the UK’s ‘Future Airspace Strategy’ was developed (in concert with the Irish Republic) to implement the objectives of the ‘Single European Sky’ project, will the government remain committed to implementing that strategy even after Britain leaves the European Union?
158. How does the government plan to make up for any shortfall in investment in the rail network arising from the loss of direct EU funding or loans from the European Investment Bank?
159. Will the government commit to maintain the Common Vehicle Standards currently in operation across the EU to ensure road vehicles may continue to travel or be sold between owners in different member states without being subject to further inspections?
Taxation
160. Will the UK’s VAT system post-Brexit continue to be broadly governed by the tenets of the EU VAT Directives, e.g. in terms of the number of VAT rates each country may set, the scope and incidence of VAT, etc., or will the government take the opportunity to reform the current system to a more bespoke British model?
161. Likewise, will other taxes governed by EU directives (e.g. alcohol and tobacco duties, capital duties, etc.) remain constructed largely as they are at present, or will the government move towards systems of taxation in each area better tailored towards the interests of UK businesses and the Exchequer?
162. Where, in different areas, the European Court of Justice has ruled in favour of taxpayers in disputes with the UK authorities over their tax rulings, finding them to be incompatible with EU law, what will happen in future when taxpayers seek to rely on those ECJ judgements; will we revert to a position where the authorities’ original rulings take precedence?
Parliamentary accountability
163. Does the government accept that nowhere in the referendum question put to the British people on 23 June 2016, was it clearly laid out what agreement the government would be seeking to reach on Britain’s future relationship with the EU in the event of a Brexit vote?
164. Does the government further accept that – looking at the detail of what was promised by the ‘Leave’ campaign in the run-up to that referendum about the consequences of a Brexit vote (e.g. a points-based immigration system, extra funding for the NHS, etc.) – all those promises have been abandoned by the current government?
165. Does the government therefore accept that – while there is a clear democratic mandate from the British people to leave the European Union, which must be followed – there is no mandate whatsoever for the specific ‘plan’ it is developing for Britain’s post-Brexit future?
166. What therefore is the government’s objection to the proposal to hold a Parliamentary debate and vote on that plan before the Article 50 negotiations are triggered, so that the public’s elected representatives have a chance to approve that plan before it is put into action?
167. And similarly, will the government commit not just to consult the devolved administrations, the devolved territories and the Mayor of London, but to seek their approval and consent to the detail of its proposed negotiating plan?
On the matter of the ‘Great Repeal Bill’, can you answer the following questions:
168. Given that many areas of EU law are policed and enforced by the relevant EU regulators, and that the government surely does not intend that they would retain that regulatory function within the UK post-Brexit, who will be responsible for the regulation of relevant laws contained in the Bill, for as long as they remain in existence?
169. At present, if the UK courts are required to interpret the meaning of an EU directive, they may ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling to guide them; if all such EU regulations are maintained – at least for an interim period – after Brexit, will the UK courts continue to follow the ECJ’s rulings as to what the underlying directive means, and if not, who will provide that interpretation?
170. Since the government is proposing to convert many important protections currently guaranteed in EU law into statutory instruments (SIs) within UK legislation, can the government guarantee that any future effort to repeal these protections will not simply be made through secondary legislation, but subject to the proper parliamentary scrutiny and debate that they deserve?
